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Oct. 5, 1959.]

OLIVE HUDSON, Respondent, v. JAMES HUDSON,
Appellant.

o

[1] Divorce-Tempora.ry Alimony-Jurisdiction: Permanent Alimony.-Neither alimony, temporary or permanent, nor costs
and fees can be awarded if no valid marriage between the
parties ever existed.
[2] ld.-Temporary Alimony-Jurisdiction: Financial Condition '
of Parties.-When a valid marriage is admitted and the issue
before the court is the validity of an ex parte divorce, the
trial court may grant the wife temporary alimony, costs and
fees to enable her to attack the ex parte divorce if she demonstrates her need for the award and her husband's ability
to pay it.
[S] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Wife's Right to Support.Since the due process clause forbids the divorce court to
adjudicate the absent wife's right to support, she cannot be
deprived by that court of whatever rights of support she had
under the law of her domicile at the time of divorce.
[4] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Meet on Property Rights of Absent
Spouse.-In a divorce action in a foreign state on constructive
service, the court there has authority to adjudicate status
(in rem) of a person residing in thnt state, but has not jurisdiction to adjudicate away (in personam) any of the then
vested property rights of the absent spouse who does not
reside in such state, who is not personally served with process
in that state and who does not appear in the action. The
personal rights of the spouses in property not within the jurisdiction of the acting court remain subject to litigation in the
proper forum.
[5] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Meet on Right to Support.-If a foreign ex parte divorce does not terminate the right to support
.arising out of the marriage, a fortiori it does not terminate
the right to support formally established and defined by a valid

[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, ~§ 173, 176; Am.
Jur., Divorce and Separation, § 607 et seq.
•
[3] See Cal.Jur.2d, Divorce and Separation, § 322; Am.Jur.,
Divorce and Separation, §§ 947, 989.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Divorce, §§ 17R. 198; [:!] Divorce,
§§ 178, 180(1); [3-5, 7, 9, 12] Divorce, § 304; [6] Divorce, §§ 178,
304; [8] Husband and Wife, §4; [10] DivO\"('e, §200; [111 Divorce,
§ 198; [13] Divorce, § 195(3); [14] Divorce, § 187; [15] Divorce,
§ 242.
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separate maintenance decree, and that right therefore continues until modified or terminated in appropriate proceedings. (Overruling Cardinale v. Cardinale, 8 Ca1.2d 762, 68 P.2.
351.)
[6] Id. ~ Temporary Alimony - Jurisdiction: Foreign Divorce.Civ. Code § 137.2, together with other sections concerning alimony and support (§§ 136, 139), specifically authorize courts
to award alimony and support during actions for divorce or
separate maintenance and govern the case of a domestic divorce
in which the court has jurisdiction of both parties, but are
not concerned with a case involving a foreign divorce.
[7] Id.-Foreign Divorce-Full Faith and Oredit: Effect of Decree.-If a husband's ex parte foreign divorce decree is valid,
the state Suprellle Court must give it the full faith and credit
required by the federal Constitution: that is, the court must
recognize that the parties are no longer married and that no
divorce can be granted the wife. Once this fact is established,
Civ. Code, §§ 136, 137.2, 139, concerning alimony and support,
become irrelevant, since they. deal solely with the award of
alimony in divorce eases.
[8] Husband and Wife - Marital Rights and Duties. - A wife's
right to support arises from the marriage and is recognized
by statute (Civ. Code, §§ 155, 174). It is not created by a
divorce decree i the decree is simply one means of enforcing
the right.
[9] Divorce - Foreign Divorce - Effect on Right to Alimony.Where there was an existing marriage at the time the wife filed
an action for divorce and permanent alimony in this state and
thereafter the husband filed a divorce action and obtained an
ex parte divorce decree in another state, if the foreign decree
dissolved the marriage the wife's prayer for divorce was
moot and only her prayer for permanent alimony remained to
be adjudicated, since the foreign decree, even if valid, did not
and could not terminate the wife's right to alimony under
California law.
[10] Id. - Permanent Alimony - Jurisdiction in Equity. - The
power to decree alimony falls within the general powers of a
court of equity, and exists independent of statutory authority.
In a proper ease it may be granted in an action other than
for divorce.
[11] Id. - Permanent Alimony - Existence of Marriage as Prerequisite. - The broad proposition that alimony cannot be
granted if the marriage has been dissolved is true if the marriage was dissolved in this state and the court had jurisdiction
over both spouses, but this proposition cannot be extended to
cover a ease where a marriage has been dissolved by an ex
parte foreign divorce decree procured by the husband, since
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the ex parte proceeding doe~ not affect the wife's support
rights, which remain open for determination in a proper forum ..
<Overruling Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Ca1.2d 516, 254 P.2d 528.)
[12] ld.-Foreign Divorce-Effect on Right to Alimony.-8ince a
wife who filed an action for divorce and permanent alimony
in this state prior to the time the husband filed an action for
divorce and secured an ex parte divorce decree in another state
can maintain her action for permanent alimony without attacking the husband's foreign decree, she may receive temporary alimony, costs and fees to enable her to continue the suit
when she has shown that she needs such relief and that the
husband has the ability to provide such assistance.
[13] ld.-Temporary Alimony-Appeal-The Supreme Court will
not upset a trial court's award of temporary alimony unless
the circumstances show as a matter of law that the trial court
has abused its discretion.
[14] ld. - Temporary Alimony - Amount of Award.-Wbere the
evidence in the wife's divorce action showed that her expenses
exceeded her earnings by $63 per month, that she was making
payments on the parties' home, that her take-home pay was
$70 per week, that her husband's take-home pay was $89 per
week during the time the parties lived in the state and he
received a pension of $33 per month, and that she anticipated
increased expenses in maintaining the action, and where the
husband did not contend that he was unable to pay the modest
amount of $65 per month ordered by the trial court, it could
not be said as a matter of law that the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding this sum as temporary alimony.
[15] ld.-Restraining Orders.-Where the evidence in a wife's
divorce action showed that the husband had threatened to
prevent the wife's enjoying any of the property in the event
of a divorce and that in his foreign divorce action he had
prayed to have sole title to the California property vested in
him, the trial court properly sought to preserve the property
until such time as the parties' rights therein could be determined, and its order restraining the husband from conveying
the California property was not an abuse of discretion.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Santa
Clara County granting temporary alimony, attorney's fees,
court costs and other relief. M. G. Del Mutolo, Judge. Affirmed.
George Porter Tobin for Appellant.
Haskell M. Goodman for Respondent.
uc.1II-M
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TRAYNOR, J.-Defendant appeals from an order granting plaintiff temporary alimony, attorney's fees, court costs,
and other relief in her action for divorce and permanent
Jllimony.
The parties were married in Reno, Nevada, on May 3,
1947. They moved to California in 1950, and plaintiff is still
domiciled in this state. Defendant left their home on April
6, 1957, announcing his intention to go to Reno, obtain a
divorce, and return in about six weeks. Plaintiff filed her
action on April 22, 1957, and defendant was personally served
in Idaho on May 16, 1957, Defendant filed his action for
divorce in Idaho on May 21, 1957, and plaintiff was personally served in California. Plaintiff did not appear in the
Idaho proceeding, On June 14, 1957, she obtained an order
to show cause why she should not be granted relief pendente
lite in the California action. On the same day, defendant
appeared by his attorney in the California action and demurred to plaintiff's complaint. The Idaho court granted
defendant a final decree of divorce on June 19, 1957. Defendant introduced this decree in the California proceeding and
resisted the order to show cause on the ground that the
decree had dissolved the marriage. Plaintiff intr('lduced evidence tending to attack the validity of the Idaho decree. Th~
court held that plaintiff had made a prima facie showing that
a marriage existed and granted the requested relief.
Defendant contends that the Idaho divorce decree must be
given full faith and credit (U.S. Const., art. IV, § 1); that
the trial court had no jurisdiction to grant alimony unless
the parties were married; that even though on a proper showing a wife may obtain temporary alimony, costs, and fees
to enable her to attack an ex parte decree, plaintiff cannot,
on the ground that her attack upon the decree is weak and
inconclusive; and that even if the Idaho decree did not automatically terminate plaintiff's right to support, the order
must still be reversed on the ground that the court abused
its discretion in determining the amount of the award.
[1] Neither alimony, temporary or permanent, nor costs
and fees ca,n be awarded if no valid marriage between the
parties ever existed. (Dietrich v. Dieirojelt, 41 Ca1.2d 497.
502-504 [261 P.2d 269] ; Hite v. Hite .. 124 Cal. 389, {391·395
[57 P. 227, 71 Am.St.Rep. 82, 45 L.R.A. 793] ; In re Cook,
42 Cal.App.2d 1, 3 [108 P.2d 46].) [2] When a valid marriage is admitted, however, and the issue before the court
is the validity of an ex parte divorep, the trial comt may
o
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grant the wife temporary alimony, costs, and fees to enable
her to attack the ex parte divorce if she demonstrates her
need for the award and her husband's ability to pay it .
.(Kopasz v. Kopasz, 34 Ca1.2d 423, 424-425 [210 P.2d 846] ;
Baldw·in v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406, 417 [170 P.2d 670];
Gromeeko v. Gromeeko, 110 Oal.App.2d 117, 127 [242 P.2d
41].) Recent District Oourt of Appeal decisions would add
another condition: the wife must prove that her attack on
the ex parte divorce is made in good faith and with a reasonable probability of success. (Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal.App.2d
666, 676-677 [199 P.2d 766]; Kalrll1ls v. Kalmus, 103 Cal.
App.2d 405, 420-423 [230 P.2d 57] ; cf. Ottinger v. Ottinger,
141 Oal.App.2d 220, 225 [296 P.2d 347].) The addition of
this condition is based on the theory that the entry of a
valid ex parte divorce automatically terminates the marriage
and a fortiori marital obligations and rights, including support rights. (Knox v. Knox, supra, at 676.) To avoid this
effect of the ex parte divorce, the wife must demonstrate that
the divorce court was without jurisdiction; only if she can
show that she is likely to succeed can her husband be required ,
to furnish the necessary funds. We need not determine
whether plaintiff has met this condition, for the theory upon
which it is based is inconsistent' with the recent decision of
the United States Supreme Oourt in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt,
354 U.S. 416 [77 S.Ot. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d 1456].
Following the Williams cases (W·illiams v. North Carolina I, 317 U.S. 287 [63 8.0t. 207, 87 L.Ed. 279, 143 A.L.R.
1273] and Willi.am.s v. North Carol-ina II, 325 U.S. 226 [65 I
S.Ot. 1092, 89 L.Ed. 1577, 157 A.L.R. 1366]), the question
arose whether a valid ex parte divorce entered at the domicile
of only one party to the marriage automatically terminated
the wife's right to support. This question was settled by the
theory of divisible divorce, foreshadowed in Esenwein v_
Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 281-283 [65 8.0t. 1118, 89 L.Ed.
1608, 157 A.L.R. 1396] (concurring opinion) and set forth
in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 [68 S.Ot. 1213, 92 L.Ed. 1561,
1 A.L.R.2d 1412], where the court heM that an ex parte
Nevada divorce procured by the husband did not terminate
the wife's prior adjudicated right to separate maintenance:
"The result ill this situation is to make the divorce divisibleto give effed to the Nevada d('cree insofar as it affects marital
status and to make it ineffective 011 the issue of alimony.
It accommodates tIle interests of both Nevada and New York
in this brokl'n marriage by restricting each State to the
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matters of her dominant concern." (Id., at·549.) Finally,
in Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, the court perfected the
divisible divorce theory by its holding that even when the
wife's right to support had not been reduced to judgment
before the ex parte divorce, that divorce could not affect her
SUpport rights. The court rested its holding on the due process
clause: since the foreign state had no personal jurisdiction
over the absent spouse, its decree ". . . to the extent it purported to affect the wife's right to support, was void and
the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not obligate New York
to give it recognition." (Id., at 419.) [3] Since the due
process clause forbids the divorce court to adjudicate the
absent wife's right to support, it follows that she cannot be
deprived by that court of whatever rights of support she had
under the law of her domicile at the time of the divorce.
(Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389,394 [317 P.2d 987].)
The crucial question in this case, therefore, is whether the
law of California permits plaintiff to obtain support following the entry of an ex parte divorce. Of the 33 jurisdictions
that have passed on this question, 23 states and the District
of Columbia have held that a wife may obtain support or
alimony following the entry of an ex parte divorce. (White
v. White, 83 Ariz. 305, 307-309 [320 P.2d 702] ; Wagster v.
Wagster, 193 Ark. 902, 906 [103 S.W.2d 638] ; Davis v. Davis,
70 Colo. 37, 41 [197 P. 241] ; Hopson v. Hopson, 221 F.2d
839,847 [App.D.C.]; Pawley v. Pawley, (Fla.) 46 So.2d 464,
471-473 [28 A.L.R.2d 1358], cert. den. 340 U.S. 866 [71
S.Ct. 90, 95 L.Ed. 632]; Durden v. Durden, 191 Ga. 404.
408 [12 S.E.2d 305] [only if wife's suit for divorce and
alimony was filed before the entry of husband's ex parte
divorce] ; Pope v. Pope, 2 Ill.2d 152, 156-157 [117 N.E.2d
65] ; Bennett v. Tomlinson, 206 Iowa 1075, 1079 [221 N.W.
837]; Willoughby v. Willoughby, 178 Kan. 62, 65-67 [283
P.2d 428] [by statute] ; Davis v. Davis, (Ky.) 303 S.W.2d
256, 257; Parker v. Parker, 211 Mass. 139. 144 r97 N.E.
988] : Malcom v. Malcom, 345 Mich. 720, 725-727 [76 N.W.
2d 831]; Sheridan v. Sheridan, 213 Minn. 24, 27-28 [4
N.W.2d 785]; Bodie v. Ba.tes, 95 Neb. 757, '764-770 [146
N.W. 1002, L.R.A.N.S. 1915E 421], second appeal, 99 Neb.
253 [156 N.W. 8], reversed on other grounds, 245 U.S. 520
r38 S.Ct. 182, 62 L.Ed. 444]: Woodh01tSe v. Woodhouse.
17 N .•I. 409, 411-412 [111 A.2d 631] [by statute] ; Vanderbilt
v. Vanderbilt, 1 N.Y.2d 342, 349-351 [135 N.E.2d 553] [by
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statute], affirmcd, 354 U.S. 416 [7i S.Ct. 1360, 1 L.Ed.2d
1456] ; Armstrong v. Armstrong, 162 Ohio St. 406, 410-411
[123 N.E.2d 267], affirmed, 350 U.S. 568 [76 S.Ct. 629, 100
L.Ed. 705); Spradling v. Spradling, 74 Okla. 276, 277-279
[181 P. 148}; Wilford v. Wilford, 38 R.L 55, 56-58 [94 A .
. 685). [contested divorce) ; Nelson v. Nelson, 71 S.D. 342, 345:346 [24 N.W.2d 327); Toncray v. Toncray, 123 Tenn. 476,
491-492 [131 S.W. 977, Ann. Cas. 1912C 284, 34 L.R.A.N.S.
1106); Hutton v. Dodge, 58 Utah 228, 237 [198 P. 165);
llicks v. Hicks, 69 Wash. 627, 630-631 [125 P. 945); Ische v.
Ische, 252 Wis. 250, 260-263 [31 N.W.2d 607,32 N.W.2d 70].)
Several of these cases rest upon familiar theories of jurisdiction: either that the divorce conrt had not decided the issue of
alimony (e.g., Ische v. Ische, su.pra, at 260-263; Hicks v.
Hicks, supra·, at 630; Malcom v. Malcom, supra, at 726), or
that the divorce court, having no jurisdiction over the wife,
could not <mt off her right to alimony (e.g., Armstrong v.
Armstrong, supra, at 410). The more recent cases accept
the divisible q.ivorce theory, emphasizing the dominant concern of the wife's domiciliary state in protecting her right to
support from a husband who seeks to avoid his duties by
obtaining an ex parte divorce in a foreign state (e.g., White
v. White, supra, at 307-310; Hopson v. Hopson, supra. at 844;
Pawley v. Pawley, supra, at 472; Wt1loughby v. Willou.ghby,
supm, at 66-67; Davis v. Davis, Ky., supra, at 257; Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, supra, at 350-351; see also Morris, Divisible
Divot'ce, 64 Harv.L.Rev. 1287).
Although this precise question has not been settled in this
state, certain rules have been established in related cases.
We have held that an Illinios wife could enforce an Illinois
support order entered subsequent to her husband's ex parte
Nevada divorce (Lewis v. Lewis, 49 Ca1.2d 389,394 [317 P.2d
987] .) Although we invoked the Vanderbilt holding in the
Lewis case, we there applied Illinois law and ,vere not called
upon to determine the force of the Vanderbilt case upon our
own law. Similarly, in Worthley v. Worthley, 44 Ca1.2d 465
[283 P.2d 19), we held that a New Jersey wife could enforce a
New Jersey separate maintenance decree entered before the
husband's ex parte Nevada divorce. Again, New Jersey law
provided the rule of decision and we followed the Supreme
Conrt's similar holding in the Estin case. The Estin rule ,vaR
applied under California law in a casc holding that an ex parte
Nevada decree did not terminate a wife's right to receive
permanent alimony awarded in a prior California interlocu-

742

()
'<

HUDSON

v.

HUDSON

[52 C.211

tory di,orce decree. (Campbell v. Campbell, 107 Cal.App.2d
732, 734-736 [238 P.2d 81].) We have also held that a wife
cannot recover separate maintenance, as distinguished from
alimony, following the entry of a valid ex parte divorce procured by the husband. (DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Ca1.2d
521, 523 [165 P.2d 457] ; Kalmus v. Kalmlls, 103 Cal.App.2d
'405,423 [230 P.2d 57] ; Knox v. Knox, 88 Cal.App.2d 666, 676
r199 P.2d 766] ; Patterson v. Patterson, 82 Cal.App.2d 838,
842·843 [187 P.2d 113] ; Calhoun v. CalhoulI, 70 Cal.App.2d
233,236-237 [160 P.2d 923]. [In a second action between the
same parties, the wife asked for permanent alimony. The
court held that the prior separate maintenance action was an
estoppel against the prosecution of another action for support
and refused to decide whether the wife could have originally
sued for alimony. Calholll! v. Calhollll. 81 Cal.App.2d 297.
304-305 [183 P.2d 922] ;] c/. Colbert v. Colbert, 28 Ca1.2d 276,
279 [169 P.2d 633].) The distinction betwcen separate maintelJanCe, which depends upon an existing marriage (Monroe v.
S1tpm'ior COllrt, 28 Ca1.2d 427,429-430 [170 P.2d 473]), and
alimony, which follows the dissolution of the marriage by
divorce, is also made by'several other states that permit alimony but not separate maintenance following an ex parte
divorce. (Pawley v. Pawley, supm, at 474-475; compare
Willoughby v. WWoltghby, supra, with Lowry v. Lowry, 174
Kan. 526, 529 [256 P.2d 869]; compare Parke,' v. Parker,
supra, with CltitUck v. ChitHck, :332 Mass. 554, 555 [126
N.E.2d 495].) In this respect, howevcr, a distinction must
be drawn between the enforcement of a preexisting decree of
separate maintenance and the securing of a decree of separate
maintenance after a foreign ex parte divorce. Although the
court cannot grant separate maintenance to a party who is not
. married, it does not follow that an existing support right
formalized in such a decree automatically terminates on the
dissolution of the marriage. [4] "In a divorce action in a
foreign state upon constructive service the court there has
authority to adjudicate status (in rem) of a person residing
in that state but has not jurisdiction to ailjudicate away (in
personam) any of the then vested property rights of the absent
spouse who t1o~s not re;;iue in SI1('h stat!', who" is not personally served with pro('ess in that state and who iloe!'! not
appl'ar in thc adioll. 'I'he Jl{'rsonal right!'! of the spouses in
property lIot within the jnri;;diction of the ading court remain subjc(·t to litigation in tIle proper forum. It seems to
me that the right of a wife, or ill a proper ease tlle husband,
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to s1Ipport from the other spouse as of the date of the divorce
is a property right which can be adjudicated only by a court
. having jurisdiction iu personam." (Schauer, J., concurriug
in DeYoung v. DeYoung, 27 Ca1.2d 521, 527 [165 P.2d 457].)
. [5] If, as we have concluded, a foreign ex parte divorce does
not terminate the right to support arising out of the marriage,
a fortiori it does not terminate the right to support formally
established and defined by a valid separate maintenance decree, and that right therefore continues until modified or
terminated in appropriate proceedings. Cardinale v. Cardina.le, 8 Ca1.2d 762 [68 P.2d 351], is to the contrary, but
that case was decided before the theory of divisible divorce
was established in Estin v. Estin, supra, 334 U.S. 541, and is
overruled.
Defendant contends, however, that section 137.2 of the
Civil Code requires an existing marriage as a jurisdictional
prerequisite for the granting of alimony pendente lite.
[6] Section 137.2, together with the other sections of the
Civil Code concerning alimony and support (§§ 136, 139)
specifically authorize courts to award alimony and support
during actions for divorce or separate maintenance. These
sections, however, govern the case of a domestic divorce in
which the court has jurisdiction of both parties. They are not
concerned with a case, such as this one, involving foreign
elements. In the normal divorce case, the parties are of
course married: if they are not married, there can be no
divorce. [7] If defendant's Idaho decree is valid, we must
give it the full faith and credit required by the Constitution
of the United States: that is, we must recognize that the
parties are no longer married and that no divorce can be
granted to plainti1f. Once this fact is established the sections
of the Civil Code invoked by defendant become irrelevant, for
they deal solely with the award of alimony or support in
divorce cases. [8] A wife's right to support arises from the
marriage and is recognized by statute. (Civ. Code, §§ 155,
174.) It is not created by a divorce decree; the decree is
simply one means of enforcing the right. We do not imply
that plaintiff has mistaken her remedy. [9] At the time her
action was filed there was an existing marriage; but if the
Idaho decree dissolved the marriage, ller prayer for divorce
iH moot and only her' prayer for permallE'llt alimouy remains
to be adjudicated. 'fhe Idaho decree, eveu if valid, did not
and could not under the Vandf'rbilt dedsion, terminate plaiutiff's right to alimony under the law of this state.

i
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[10] Defendant contends that our courts can grant alimony
only in an action for divorce, on the ground that it is only in
such an action that the statutes provide for alimony. This
contention was answered adversely to defendant as early as •
1869. In Galland v. Galland, 38 Cal. 265, a wife sued her
husband for alimony without asking for a divorce. The
s~tutes. contained no provision for alimony save in an action
for divorce. The husband cOIltended that the statutes were
exclusive and that the court lacked power to grant alimony
in any other case. The court held that it had general equity
powers to grant alimony in cases aside from those specifically
provided for by statute and answered the husband's contention in these words: "The Legislature was not dealing with
the general subject of alimony, as an independent subjectmatter of legislation; but only, as one of the incidents of an
application for divorce. It saw fit to define the power of the
Court over the allowance of alimony on an application for
divorce; but was not considering the subject of alimony in
any other class of cases. If it had provided that a writ of
11e ezeaf or distri11gas might issue against a defendant in an
action for divorce, it would scarcely be claimed by anyone
that this was equivalent to a declaration that such writs should
not issue in any other class of actions. For the same reason, a
provision for alimony in a suit for divorce is not to be considered as a declaration that alimony shall not be allowed in
other actions." (Id., at 267-268. See also Pa:z:ton v. Pa:z:tOll,
150 Cal. 667, 670-672 [89 P. 10831; Livingston v. Bu.perior
Court, 117 Cal. 633, 634-636 [49 P. 836, 38 L.R.A. 1751 ; and
Dunphy v. Dunphy, 161 Cal. 87, 92 [118 P. 445], allowing
temporary alimony pending suit for annulment despite the
absence of express statutory authorization; c/. Bernard v.
Bernard, 79 Cal.App.2d 353,356-357 [179 P.2d 6251.)
[11] In Dimon v. Dimon, 40 Cal.2d 516 [254 P.2d 528],
however, a majority of this court held that a wife's right to
rE'cover alimony or support for herself is limited to the period
when the parties are husband and wife. The Dimon case was
decided before the Vanderbilt case and must be reexamined
il1 the light of that case.
The broad proposition of the Dimon case that alimony
cannot be granted if the marriage has been dissolved cannot
be denied, if the marriage was dissolved in this state and the
court had jurisdiction over both SpOUISt'S. (See Long v. j,()lIg,
17 Ca1.2d 409,410 [110 P.2d 3831; Tolle v. Su.perior Court, 10
Ca1.2d 95, 97-98 [73 P.2d 607].) But the Dimon case ex-
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tf'lIdf'd this proposit.ion to ('oVf'r a f'3Se where the marriage
had been dissolvf'd by an rx part.e Connecticut decree procured by the wife. The wife's right to support from her husband had not been adjudicated prior to the divorce decree as
in the Estin case. After Est·in, but before Vanderbilt, the
. argument could have been made that by terminating the mar. riage the ex parte divorce automatically terminated all rights,
including the nonadjudicated right to support that grew out
of that marriage. But after the Vanderbilt case, such a
proposition cannot be maintained, for it is now clear that the
ex parte proceeding does not affect the wife's support rights.
By treating the Connecticut decree as terminating any pos- .
sibility that the plaintiff in DimO'1l- could secure a support
award in this state, we gave that decree more weight in this
state than it is now constitutionally entitled to receive. To
follow Dimon after Vanderbilt in a case involving a foreign
ex parte divorce is to permit the court of another state to
preclude the courts of this state from deciding a question of
California law that the foreign court had no jurisdiction to
determine. Under Vanderbm the conclusion is inescapable
that the issue of alimony which could not be decided by the
divorce court, remains open for determination in a proper
forum. The Dimon case is therefore overruled.
The doctrine of divisible divorce set forth in Estin and .
Vanderbilt provides a sensible solution to the problems engendered by ex parte divorces. Its repUdiation in this case
would compel collateral attacks upon such divorces to protect
rights to support, with resulting confusion as to marital
status, property rights, rights of innocent third persons who
may have relied· upon the decree, and the legitimacy of
children. (See Powell, And Repenf At Leisure, 58 Harv.L.
Rev. 930.) California has a dominant interest in the wellbeing of her domiciliaries, and the courts of this state are
open to adjudicate their support rights following an ex parte
divorce.
[12] Since plaintiff may maintain her action for permanent alimony without attacking defendant's Idaho decree,
it follows that she may receive temporary alimony, costs, and
fees to enable her to continue the suit when she has shown
that she needs such relief and that defendant has the ability
to provide such assistance. (Sweeley v. Swecley, 28 Ca1.2d
389, 390 [170 P.2d 469].) [13] This court will not upset a
trial court's award of temporary alimony unlells the circum;tances show as a matter of law that the court has abused
(I

'I

746

()

HUDSON

v.

HUDSON

[52 C.2d

its discretion. (Baldwi,~ v. Baldwin, 28 Cal.2d 406, 413,
417-418 [170 P.2d 670] ; Swcclry v. Sweeley, supra, at 393394.) [14] Defendant contends that the combined income
of· plaintiff and her minor son by a former marriage exceeded
his own earnings by $1,600 per year. Defendant fails to C011sider, as the trial court evidently did, that plaintiff's son
"ras about to enter college and was unable to contribute to
his mother's support. The evidence showed that plaintiff's
expenses exceeded her earnings by $63 per month; that she
was making the payments on the parties' California home;
that her take-home pay was $70 per week, although her
husband's take-home pay had been $89 per week during the
time the parties lived in California and he received a pension
of $33 per month; and thli.t she antieipated increased expenses in maintaining the present action. Defendant does
not contend that he is unable to pay the modest amount of
the award ($65 per month) ordered by the trial eourt. On
this record, we cannot say as a matter of law that the trial
court abused its discretion.
[15] Finally, defendant objects to that part of the order
that restrained him from conveying the California property.
The evidence showed that defendant had threatened to prevent plaintiff's enjoying any of the property in the event
of a divorce and that he had prayed to have sole title to the
California property vested in him in the Idaho proceedings.
The trial court properly sought to preserve the property until
such time as the parties' rights therein could be adjudicated;
its order was not an abuse of discretion.
The order appealed from is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., Spence, J., Peters, J., and
White, J., concurred.
McCOMB, J.-I concur in the order for the sole reason
that, in my opinion, the facts are analogous to those in Baldwin
v. Baldwin, 28 Ca1.2d 406 [170 P.2d 670], where the controlling rule of law is stated at page 416 et seq.

